Standing on the Shoulders of Giants : Where Do We Go from Here to Bring the Fire Service into the Domestic Intelligence Community? by Dennis, Joshua M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-09
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants : Where Do We
Go from Here to Bring the Fire Service into the
Domestic Intelligence Community?
Dennis, Joshua M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: WHERE 
DO WE GO FROM HERE TO BRING THE FIRE SERVICE 




Joshua M. Dennis 
 
September 2012 
 Thesis Co-Advisors: Robert Simeral 
  Kathleen Kiernan 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Where Do We 
Go from Here to Bring the Fire Service into the Domestic Intelligence Community? 
 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Joshua M. Dennis 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____________.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The United States Fire Service has not only a role but a need to be included in the domestic intelligence community. 
The fire service in gaining access to information and adding untapped sources of information/intelligence can add 
value to the efforts of the domestic intelligence community and in return provide value added to fire departments’ 
day-to-day operations. Absent is a strong national guidance for fire service intelligence integration, smart practice 
models, and local solutions have filled the vacuum. This thesis will look at the future of fire service intelligence 
sharing and how to pick up where previous efforts left off. 
Specifically, a model for a national fire intelligence framework is presented. This model considers current 
local level intelligence solutions within the fire service, and a holistic approach that can meet the needs of unique 
individual departments. The secondary intent for this thesis is also to stimulate discussion, advance the evolution of 
fire service intelligence, suggest some operational models, and provide a point upon which others can build upon. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Fire Service Intelligence, Information Sharing, Domestic Intelligence, 
Suspicious Activity Reporting 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
73 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM 




Joshua M. Dennis 
District Chief, Chicago Fire Department 
J.D., DePaul University, 2003 
M.S., Lewis University, 2006 
B.A., Saint Xavier University, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 











Author:  Joshua M. Dennis 
 
 









Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The United States Fire Service has not only a role but a need to be included in the 
domestic intelligence community. The fire service in gaining access to information and 
adding untapped sources of information/intelligence can add value to the efforts of the 
domestic intelligence community and in return provide value added to fire departments 
day-to-day operations. Absent is strong national guidance for fire service intelligence 
integration, smart practice models, and local solutions have filled the vacuum. This thesis 
will look at the future of fire service intelligence sharing and how to pick up where 
previous efforts left off. 
Specifically, a model for a national fire intelligence framework is presented. This 
model considers current local level intelligence solutions within the fire service, and a 
holistic approach that can meet the needs of unique individual departments. The 
secondary intent for this thesis is also to stimulate discussion, advance the evolution of 
fire service intelligence, suggest some operational models, and provide a point upon 
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Currently, the majority of the fire service receives intelligence second hand 
through the media, by the largess of others or through personal relationships. Therefore, 
currently there is no clear uniform interface upon which fire departments can rely. The 
objective of this thesis is to advance the existing literature regarding fire service 
information/intelligence sharing via a long-term solution. This solution can be advanced, 
implemented and realized through strong national policy linked to a grassroots evolution 
of information sharing between all fire departments. The grassroots evolution of Fire 
Service information/intelligence sharing will use different connection points within the 
domestic intelligence enterprise. The main goal of this solution and thesis is to provide a 
roadmap allowing all fire departments, regardless of size, to have an avenue to become 
engaged in the domestic intelligence enterprise. 
B. BACKGROUND  
The fire service is primarily responsible for the day-to-day mitigation of incidents, 
not involving arrest or detainment, in the United States. Yet, there is still no national 
framework for integration of the fire service into the domestic intelligence community. 
Different approaches have been taken and written about, such as the Fire Service 
Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) and local best practices. Large metropolitan fire 
departments, such as New York and Chicago, have developed divisions dedicated to this 
task, while other large fire departments, such as Boston and Phoenix, work within law 
enforcement-established fusion centers.  
Intelligence/information sharing was officially addressed by the U. S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) when DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 
launched the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) in December 2006. The FSIE 
began as a pilot information sharing partnership between the Fire Department—City of 
New York (FDNY) and I&A. The pilot resulted in lessons learned by both DHS and 
FDNY, while the main lesson learned was the benefit of information sharing between the 
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federal government and the fire service. In addition, increased clarity was gained 
regarding specific information that each organization could offer and receive, and the 
institutional requirements to enable two-way information sharing. This pilot applied to 
one fire department and provided an example of information/intelligence sharing for 
large urban departments. Smaller fire departments and fire departments without the 
resources to dedicate personnel and resources to either an internal intelligence unit or a 
law enforcement fusion center have no formal mechanism to receive intelligence or 
provide information to intelligence assets. 
As a result of the initial FDNY pilot, in September 2007, 15 fire departments, 
along with representatives from the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and 
the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), met with representatives from the 
federal government,1 to become the inaugural FSIE Conference. federal government 
representatives included:  
• DHS I&A,  
• Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Assessment Center (HITRAC), 
• National Preparedness Directorate,  
• United States Fire Administration (USFA),  
• Emergency Management Response-Information Sharing & Analysis 
Center (EMR-ISAC),  
• The National Operations Center (NOC),  
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),  
• Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS),  
• Risk Management Division (RMD),  
• Director of National Intelligence (DNI)  
• Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment 
(PM-ISE).  
The fifteen fire departments included:  
• FDNY  
• San Francisco  
                                                 
1 United States Fire Administration. FSIE Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., 2010. 
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• Los Angeles County  
• Los Angeles City  
• Seattle  
• Houston  
• Las Vegas  
• Phoenix 
• Chicago  
• Boston 
• Denver 
• Washington DC 
• Philadelphia 
• Baltimore  
• Miami Dade County 
The keynote speaker at the FSIE conference was the sitting Under Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Charlie 
Allen, also appointed as the Chief Intelligence Officer for the department. Mr. Allen 
made a pledge to support expanding the direct intelligence capabilities of the fire service, 
both as recipients and suppliers of information. This was reiterated by I&A 
representatives at subsequent FSIE meetings. Consistently, during the initial phases of the 
FSIE, I&A was an advocate for greater fire representation within fusion centers. As a 
member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), I&A worked with the IC to see fusion 
centers and the fire departments connect as both customers and as valuable sources of 
information, and for public safety departments to view the IC as a resource and a partner. 
As a result of the initial FSIE conference, two working groups were formed. One 
working group was established to work on the governance of how the fire service and the 
federal government would communicate. The Governance Working Group was 
comprised of a seven-department steering committee. The Governance Working Group 
also monitored network governance developments necessary to renovate existing DHS 
computer-based communication channels and technological tools to allow secure 
information and intelligence sharing portals for the fire service community. The second, 
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Requirements Working Group addressed the information/intelligence requirements for 
the fire service. The Requirements Working Group was also structured as a seven-
department steering committee. The requirements group oversaw the development of 
national intelligence requirements for the fire service community. The committee 
identified information/intelligence needs, the critical information required to protect the 
homeland from national strategic threats, and they determined what 
information/intelligence fire departments need to know in order to prepare for and safely 
respond to incidents of an all hazards /all crimes nature. Later in the year, a third working 
group was added—the Training Development Working Group. This group was tasked 
with working on the development of training specifically for fire service in intelligence 
and information sharing. This group’s efforts eventually lead to fire service Terrorism 
Liaison Officer training programs.  
C. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE 
In the time since the 2007 FSIE conference, subsequent conferences and meetings 
were conducted. A continued commitment was exhibited by major decision makers from 
the fire service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other stakeholders 
discussed information/ intelligence needs, shared best practices, and realized the need to 
achieve consensus on protocols for information sharing within the fire service 
community. As a result, the following documents were developed:  
• FSIE Concept Plan  
• FSIE National Strategy 2008 
• FSIE Fact sheet 
• FSIE Intelligence Requirements 
• Fire Service Integration added as an appendix to the Baseline Capabilities 
for Fusion Centers 
By 2010, the groundwork had been laid and a foundation built for the expansion 
of the FSIE throughout the fire service. At this point, the focus shifted away from fire 
departments and toward professional/political/lobbying organizations. The FSIE advisory 
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group was then formed and fire department representation in the process was reduced 
from 15 to four fire departments (See Figure 1).2  At this point, the formal FSIE 
dissolved. In addition to waning support, other factors that led to the dissolution of the 
formal FSIE were: 
• Decreased ability to maintain engagement due to budgetary concerns   
• Attrition/promotion of committee members and key advocates within I&A 
• Inability to achieve consensus as to incorporation of other aspects of the 
fire service, such as: 
• Volunteer fire departments 
• Mutual aid organizations 
• Fire departments outside mega regions 
• Privately operated fire departments 
• The role of the Emergency Medical Service (EMS), with a 
disparate and diverse system similar to the fire service 
• Relegation of the original FSIE to working group status 
• Formation of a new FSIE Advisory Group (See Chart 
Below) that replaced fire departments with organizations 
that had no nexus to intelligence or street operations, such 
as the National Fire Protection Association and the 
National Association of State Fire Marshals  
Through  the passage of time and a maturing of the fusion process, which was in 
its infancy during the operation of the FSIE, the opportunity now exists for a renewed 




                                                 











II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In looking at domestic intelligence sharing on the local level and outside law 
enforcement entities, there are three main areas of literature. The first area of literature to 
be examined is the fundamentals of intelligence. The second area is the structure of 
domestic intelligence apparatus. The third area is a delineation of the existing 
mechanisms of dissemination of the intelligence and intelligence products with state and 
local government. 
A. INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS 
A view of the overall collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence by 
government is presented in ten (10) articles contained in volume one (1) of Strategic 
Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government.3 In addition to articles 
relating to the history and state of intelligence in the United States, articles also examine 
the United Kingdom and Canada. To supplement the articles provided in this volume, 
primary intelligence documents and information are provided in the Appendix, such as: 
• The National Security Act of 1947 
• Leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1047-2006 
• The Aspin-Brown Commission on the Purpose and Challenges of 
Intelligence 
In the introduction to intelligence studies literature, several fundamentals of 
intelligence are addressed. Collection of intelligence is explored in explaining the “Ints” 
of intelligence.4 
• TECHINT – Technical intelligence from satellites and reconnaissance 
airplanes 
• HUMINT – Classic espionage through human intelligence 
                                                 
3 Lock K. Johnson, ed. Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government. Vol. 1. Westport, 
CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. 
4 Ibid., 4. 
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• OSINT – Open source intelligence from open literature such as 
newspapers 
• SIGINT – Signals intelligence from capturing communications from one 
person to another 
The analysis of intelligence is next touched upon. Analysis “brings insight to 
information that has been collected and processed.”5 After information is analyzed, the 
information is disseminated. Dissemination, for purposes of this thesis, refers to the 
passing of information to policy officials.6 In terms of SLT, intelligence dissemination is 
the delivery of intelligence to first response organizations. Traditionally, the first 
response organizations that receive intelligence are law enforcement, organizations with 
formal relationships with groups, such as the JTTF, and fire departments with personal 
relationships, or fire departments who have developed their own intelligence integration 
system (with sponsorship).From the research, first response and public safety 
organizations that have no discernible intelligence integration are public health and 
emergency management.  
This information represents the basic functions of intelligence for the national 
umbrella under which the SLT intelligence apparatus exist. Figure 2shows where the 
federal intelligence apparatus falls under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 
                                                 
5 Lock K. Johnson, ed. Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government. Vol. 1. Westport, 




Figure 2.   The Members of the Intelligence Community Grouped by Program Managers, 
Department, and Service. 
The national intelligence enterprise and intelligence community was recently 
explained in an overview presented to the 111th Congress.7 The DNI is the head of the 
U.S. intelligence community (IC) and principal advisor to the President on intelligence 
issues.8 The U.S. IC consists of the: 
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
• Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
• National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
                                                 
7 Intelligence, Office of the Director of National. “http://www.dni.gov/overview.pdf.” 2009. (accessed October 
2011). 
8 Ibid., 1. 
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• National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
• National Security Agency (NSA) 
• DOJ – Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Office of National 
Security Intelligence (ONSI) 
• Department of Energy (DoE) – Office of Intelligence and Counter 
Intelligence  
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A) 
• Department of State – Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) 
• Department of the Treasury – Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) 
• U.S. Army 
• U.S. Navy 
• U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
• U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
• DHS – U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 
In addition to the intelligence community the Congressional briefing also presents 
the DNI’s ten (10) functions that support the IC.9 
• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
• National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) 
• National Counter proliferation Center (NCPC) 
• The Special Security Center (SSC) 
• The National Intelligence University (NIU) 
• Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) 
• The Center for Security Evaluation’s (CSE) 
                                                 
9 Intelligence, Office of the Director of National. “http://www.dni.gov/overview.pdf.” 2009. (accessed October 
2011), 2–3. 
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• The National Intelligence Council (NIC) 
• The National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) 
• The Mission Support Center 
Under this framework, DHS I&A is designated to “work closely with state, local, 
tribal, and private sector partners.”10 Therefore, under the IC framework, DHS I&A will 
be the primary source for IC interaction with SLC for purposes of this thesis. The 
intelligence from the above groups and agencies is what is placed into the funnel that 
feeds domestic intelligence consumers. The spigot to the funnel is controlled by DHS 
I&A and the FBI.  
B. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS 
“DHS tasked as primary source of information for state and local partners,” and 
has had an intelligence component since DHS’s 2003 inception.11  Intelligence elements 
in six (6) DHS components existed upon formation:  
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  
• U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),  
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),  
• The Transportation Security Administration (TSA),  
• U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and  
• U.S. Secret Service. 
DHS Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) was formed by Secretary Chertoff during the 
2005 reorganization, “to ensure that information related to homeland security threats is  
 
 
                                                 
10 Intelligence, Office of the Director of National. “http://www.dni.gov/overview.pdf.” 2009. (accessed October 
2011), 15. 
11 Mark A. Randol, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and 
Oversight Challenges for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2009. 1. 
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collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the full spectrum of homeland security 
customers in the department, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector and in 
the Intelligence Community (IC).”12 
The author assesses DHS’s state and local effort by citing the journal Homeland 
Security Affairs, “[t]he Department had become ‘irrelevant’ to states and localities as a 
source of intelligence because that intelligence lacks timeliness and adds so little value to 
local terrorism efforts. In addition, “the stream of intelligence from DHS is useless ... 
discussions at the pilot sites, that the quality of intelligence support in the wake of critical 
domestic and international homeland security-related incidents is a top priority for state 
and local fusion center leaders and a key determinant of how they evaluate DHS analytic 
support.”13 An example of this is the obvious holiday warnings. No universal standards 
for fire service integration make it difficult to judge the effectiveness of information 
sharing because people do not know what they do not know. Another example of this is 
the “intelligence spam,” which has been a common observation of intelligence 
consumers. The amount of primary documents from DHS regarding information sharing 
is voluminous but rarely delineates policy regarding intelligence sharing outside of law 
enforcement. Although universal intelligence sharing has long been a stated goal, there 
are no clearly articulated steps to achieving that goal.   
1. DHS Intelligence Functions 
Congress makes information sharing a top priority as Randol cited Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. In addition, 
Randol correctly points out that intelligence is not only about spies and satellites. 
Intelligence is about the thousands and thousands of routine, everyday observations and 
activities. Ergo the importance of “See Something Say Something” and engaging 
disciplines outside law enforcement.  
                                                 
12 Mark A. Randol, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and 
Oversight Challenges for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2009, 4. 
13 Ibid., 12. 
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In addition, this article lists DHS I&A products and their purposes along with a 
brief description of the National Operations Center (NOC) establishing the NOC as the 
primary national level hub for domestic incident management, operations coordination, 
and situational awareness. The NOC is staffed by numerous federal, state, and local 
agencies and fuses law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response and 
private sector reporting. 14 
In writing about DHS I&A, each component is addressed including the Office of 
the Deputy Under Secretary for Field Operations (DU/S-F) State and Local Program 
Office (SLPO), under which falls the Fusion Center Program intelligence officers.15  This 
article further supplies the definition of a fusion center as “collaborative effort of two or 
more federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, 
expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to 
detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity”16 
The article continues by laying out the intelligence functions of the DHS 
divisions. Looking specifically at: 
• Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate (OPS)—Intelligence 
Division  
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Intelligence Element 
o CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC) 
o National Targeting Center (NTC) (Legacy of U.S. Customs 
Service) 
o Border Field Intelligence Center (BORFIC) 
o Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) 
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) - 
Intelligence Element 
                                                 
14 Mark A. Randol, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and 
Oversight Challenges for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2009, 10. 
15 Ibid., 15. 
16 “P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 322.” n.d. 
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• Transportation Security Administration (TSA) TSA Office 
of Intelligence (TSA-OI)  
• The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Intelligence Element 
• Cryptologic 
• Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) - 
USSS 
Finally, DHS formal intelligence is shown to include the No Fly and Selectee 
Lists. The “No Fly” and “Selectee” lists are subsets of the TSDB that are used to screen 
air travelers. The “No Fly” list contains the names of individuals who are prohibited from 
boarding an aircraft “based on the totality of information, as representing a threat to 
commit an act of “international terrorism” or ”domestic terrorism” (as defined in 18 
U.S.C. 2331).17 
Overall, this is a good summary of the DHS intelligence functions. This is an 
excellent background piece, yet very little analysis is presented in the reading. Each of 
the different missions of the DHS divisions can be assumed to produce a disparate 
number of intelligence requirements. The differing intelligence requirements more than 
justify the large number of distinct intelligence shops contained within DHS. What would 
have tied this article together better would have been to lay out the structure of DHS 
intelligence, as was done well, and then provide greater detail on how I&A brings all this 
information together and interacts with SLT entities. 
C.  STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The literature regarding state and local intelligence sharing is primarily law 
enforcement focused. In addition, most of the primary documents regarding this area are 
DOJ based. Opinions arguments and theories for intelligence sharing expansion beyond 
law enforcement (e.g., fire service, public health) have come in the form of articles and  
 
 
                                                 
17 Mark A. Randol, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and 
Oversight Challenges for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2009, 38. 
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prior thesis work. Although there is mention of fire service integration in some of the 
articles examined, there is no clear uniform policy or model promulgated from the IC 
regarding this issue.  
The information sharing policy for the IC was promulgated in a strategic 
document from the DNI.18 This document articulates the information sharing mission, 
key concepts, goals and objectives. Fostering information sharing is mandated of the 
DNI, as per the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.19 The DNI’s 
articulated information sharing mission for the IC is “Improve responsible, secure 
information sharing across the Intelligence Community and with external partners and 
customers.”20 Below is the DNI’s information sharing goals:21 
1.  Optimize the Sharing of Information and Intelligence within the IC and 
with Partners and Customers to Enable Decision Advantage 
2. Maximize and Integrate IC Capabilities to Discover, Access, Retain, 
Store, Share, and Exploit Information 
3. Maximize and Integrate IC Capabilities to Secure Information 
4. Review, Align, and Strengthen the Governance Framework to Optimize 
Responsible Information Sharing, while Protecting Civil Liberties and 
Privacy 
5. Promote a Culture of Responsible Information Sharing 
Goal one (1), “Optimize the Sharing of Information and Intelligence within the 
IC and with Partners and Customers to Enable Decision Advantage,” is directly germane 
to this thesis as goal one (1) seeks to understand the intelligence needs of SLT entities 
and directs the IC to address those needs. Addressing SLT needs can be achieved, per the 
DNI, through meeting the following objectives:22 
                                                 
18 United States Intelligence Community: Strategic Intent for Information Sharing 2011-2015. Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011. 
19 50 USC 403–103(g). 
20 Ibid., ii. 
21 Ibid., 2–3. 
22 Ibid., 2. 
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1.1.  Identify, validate and address IC, partner, and customer information 
sharing needs 
1.2.  Manage IC, partner, and customer sharing relationships 
1.3.  Identify, acquire, and provide relevant information both inside and outside 
the IC to improve decision advantage 
1.4.  Leverage information sharing capabilities of customers and partners for 
use by the IC 
In light of fusion, and the goal under which the objectives above are meant to 
address partners and customers, they will be assumed to be various SLT entities. 
Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that this document is from the DNI, this mission, these 
goals, and each goal’s objectives are the controlling doctrine for national intelligence and 
information sharing across the entire IC. 
Testimony regarding the DHS I&A SLT information sharing environment (ISE) 
was given in October of 2011, by Eileen R. Laurence Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues. Subsequent to this testimony, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
issued a report.23  In its summary of the testimony the GAO wrote,  
In response to its mission to share information with state and local 
partners, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has taken steps 
to identify these partner’s information needs, develop related intelligence 
products, and obtain more feedback on its products. I&A also provides a 
number of services to its state and local partners that were generally well 
received by the state and local officials we contacted. However, I&A has 
not yet defined how it plans to meet its state and local mission by 
identifying and documenting the specific programs and activities that are 
most important for executing this mission. The office also has not 
developed performance measures that would allow I&A to demonstrate 
the expected outcomes and effectiveness of state and local programs and 
activities. In December 2010, GAO recommended that I&A address these 
issues, which could help it, make resource decisions and provide 
accountability over its efforts.24 
 
                                                 
23 Information Sharing: Progress Made and Challenges Remaining in Sharing Terrorism-Related Information. 
Statement for the Record To the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, United 
States Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.: GAO, October 2011. 
24 Ibid., 1. 
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This document points out on numerous occasions that SLT information sharing’s 
focus is solely based on Fusion Centers and law enforcement, “Consistent with the 
Intelligence Reform Act, the ISE is to provide the means for sharing terrorism-related 
information across five communities—homeland security, law enforcement, defense, 
foreign affairs, and intelligence—in a manner that, among other things, leverages 
ongoing efforts.”25 This approach ignores not only the totality of first response 
organizations but also private sector stakeholders (e.g., owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure), and other government stakeholders (e.g., public health). In addition, the 
GAO illuminates efforts to bolster fusion centers with collaboration from the DOJ.26 
Fusion centers are further discussed in terms of maintaining operations, in light of budget 
constraints, with additional grant funding, training, and technical assistance from DHS.27  
Finally, this report acknowledges that thirty-seven (37) of the seventy-two (72) 
recognized fusion centers fail to meet the designated fusion center baseline capabilities, 
designed primarily to meet local law enforcement needs.28 
The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) operates 
out of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to coordinate the dissemination of 
information from DHS and DOJ to SLT entities within the homeland security enterprise. 
In 2009, the ITACG published an intelligence guide for first responders “to assist state, 
local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private 
sector personnel in accessing and understanding federal counterterrorism, homeland 
security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting.”29 This guide is a basic 
guide crafted for all disciplines and provides baseline information or an introduction, for 
those new to intelligence, of the basic concepts, jargon, and facets of intelligence and the 
intelligence community. 
                                                 
25 Information Sharing: Progress Made and Challenges Remaining in Sharing Terrorism-Related Information. 
Statement for the Record To the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, United 
States Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.: GAO, October 2011, 6. 
26 Ibid., 9. 
27 Ibid., 10. 
28 Ibid., 12. 
29 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for Firest Responders. 
Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, 10. 
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After intelligence sources are explained the Intelligence Community (IC) and the 
activities of the IC are presented. Intelligence sources and the IC are built upon with an 
explanation of the intelligence cycle:30 
1. Planning and Direction: Establishing the intelligence requirements of the 
policymakers – the President, the National Security Council, military 
commanders, and other officials in major departments and governmental 
agencies. 
2. Collection: Gathering of raw data from which finished intelligence is 
produced. 
3. Processing and Exploitation: Conversion of large amounts of data to a 
form suitable for the production of finished intelligence; includes 
translations, decryption, and interpretation of information stored on film 
and magnetic media through the use of highly refined photographic and 
electronic processes. 
4. Analysis and Production: Integration, evaluation, and analysis of all 
available data and the preparation of a variety of intelligence products, 
including timely, single-source, event-oriented reports and longer term, 
all-source, finished intelligence studies. 
5. Dissemination: Delivering the products to consumers who request them. 
The ITACG Guide then delivers the five (5) categories of finished intelligence:31 
1. Current intelligence  
2. Estimative intelligence  
3. Warning intelligence  
4. Research intelligence  
5. Scientific and technical intelligence 
 
                                                 
30 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for Firest Responders. 
Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, 18–19. 
31 Ibid., 20–22. 
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The second section of the ITACG Guide is dedicated to the handling of 
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). This is important to public safety personnel 
new to receiving information from official sources. The reason why this section is 
important to new intelligence/information recipients is that CUI may be commonly 
available to responders on all level of an organization. Having information widely 
distributed increases the chance for misuse as CUI, does not meet the standards for 
National Security Classification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is 
pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the important interests of 
entities outside the federal government, and under law or policy requires protection from 
unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on exchange or 
dissemination. CUI includes many caveats, such as “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” 
(FOUO).32 
In addition, this section makes the important designation that FOUO is not a 
classification akin to “Secret,” but a designation as to how a document or the information 
therein should be disseminated or controlled. FOUO information is not for the public but 
can be given to others with the approval of the originating agency.33 Further in the CUI 
explanation a definition of need-to-know is given. Need-to-know is defined by the 
ITACG as, “the determination made by an authorized holder of information that a 
prospective recipient requires access to specific information in order to perform or assist 
in the lawful and authorized governmental function, i.e., access is required for the 
performance of official duties.”34  Finally, the CUI section only FOUO is presented as a 
universal information caveat, although individual agency created caveats, such as Law 
Enforcement Sensitive (LES) and Official Use Only (OUO) are acknowledged as being 
used and possibly having additional requirements, as determined by the agency assigning 
a LES or OUO caveat.35 The fact that these additional designations are acknowledged but  
 
                                                 
32 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for Firest Responders. 
Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, 26. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 27. 
35 Ibid. 
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not explicitly endorsed is interesting in that the question becomes—was this a deliberate 
omission as LES and OUO could be viewed as a method one discipline could use to 
insulate information from other disciplines?   
Next, the ITACG Guide addresses security clearances. Clearance needs, levels, 
grantors and basic procedures are presented. After clearances are addressed, the utility of 
intelligence is presented. Intelligence utility is presented as what intelligence can do and 
what intelligence cannot do. What intelligence can do is described as:36 
• Providing decision advantage, by improving the decision-making of 
consumers and partners while hindering that of our enemies. 
• Warning of potential threats. 
• Insight into key current events. 
• Situational awareness. 
• Long-term strategic assessments on issues of ongoing interest. 
• Assistance in preparation for senior-level meetings that include national 
security-related subjects. 
• Pre-travel security overviews and support. 
• Reports on specific topics, either as part of ongoing reporting or upon 
request for short-term needs. 
• Compiling U.S. government knowledge on persons of interest. 
What intelligence cannot do is presented as intelligence cannot violate U.S. law 
and intelligence cannot predict the future.37 
Intelligence products for first responders are the next topic of the ITACG Guide. 
The intelligence product section lists both classified and unclassified products and 
information sources and is divided by report type. Examples of situational awareness, 
threat reporting sources, and information portals are unclassified, such as HSIN, LEO, 
                                                 
36 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for Firest Responders. 
Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, 34. 
37 Ibid., 35. 
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Intelink-U, RISSNET, TRIPwire, FPS Portal, and Open Source Center (OSC) or Secret, 
such as NCTC Online—Secret (NOL-S), Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OI&A) 
webpage, FBINet, and FBI Intelink/SIPRNet.38 Information report examples are 
Intelligence Information Report (IIR) and Homeland Information Report (HIR).39 Other 
information examples given are:40 
• Intelligence Assessment (IA) 
• Threat Assessment (TA) 
• Special assessment (SA) 
• Intelligence Bulletin (IB) 
• Roll Call Release 
• Terrorism Summary (TERRSUM) 
What each information example contains is given; along with variations on 
information types (e.g., IAs and IBs can be joint and written by multiple agencies). This 
leads to the next section of the Guide that addresses how to understand information 
received, from all sources and how to understand language used in intelligence 
documents. Understanding intelligence writing, language used, and why certain writing 
types and language are used is extremely important to any person new to intelligence. 
The guide then concludes with a dictionary of intelligence terms and a list of common 
intelligence acronyms.  
The value of this guide is that the inclusion of new disciplines into the intelligence 
cycle. Consumers and providers of information/intelligence will gain a broader 
perspective through familiarization of content. The ITACG’s guide is a good baseline for 
the uninitiated from any discipline due to the general information given and lack of any 
particular imbedded biases toward any one discipline or group through discipline specific 
                                                 
38 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for Firest Responders. 
Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, 38, 45–46. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 39. 
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jargon, examples, or pre-established discipline based information access restrictions. 
Finally, it is ironic that for all of DHS’s edicts regarding information sharing the 
documents addressing fire service integration into intelligence came from the DOJ.41 
As a result of the number of academic works and theses addressing the topic of 
information sharing and the information above, this thesis will attempt to advance both 
theory and practice by identifying the next steps required  to develop a national standard 
and general framework for intelligence sharing with the fire service. All of this 
information shows the frameworks in place for information sharing. In light of all of 
these systems, programs, inputs, and outputs, there remains no clear method for inclusion 
of the fire service into domestic information and intelligence sharing. Yet, all of the 
information above show that avenues for information sharing exist and the 
rules/policies/procedures the fire service will need to follow. This thesis will show how 
this can be leveraged by the fire service to allow for information and intelligence sharing 
across the fire service.  
 
                                                 
41 Justice, United States, Department of “Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.” April 2010, 18. 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
For this thesis, a new concept is being proposed for information/intelligence 
sharing between U.S. domestic intelligence and the fire service. This new concept is 
based upon the lessons learned from and previous efforts of the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise (FSIE). This new concept will provide guidance for local fire departments to 
gain access to and provide information/intelligence to U.S. domestic intelligence.  
To build the integration concept, this thesis looks at how the federal domestic 
intelligence framework addresses the fire service. In addition, specific policies to foster 
intelligence sharing across the entire fire service and the differences between policies 
and/or achieved/unachieved goals will be examined. Federal frameworks are important, 
as national intelligence efforts are led by the federal government. Looking to these 
frameworks using appreciative inquiry is the foundation upon which any fire service 
solution will be based for not only successful integration, but to also maintain continuity 
within the domestic intelligence enterprise. As a result of this examination, a new avenue 
for fire service integration will be recommended for development and implementation. 
Furthermore, in looking at smart practices and policy documents, the following 
questions focused the research:  
1. How can the fire service as a whole be integrated into the domestic 
intelligence community?  
a. What is the current framework of domestic intelligence sharing? 
b. What is the current framework for integrating the fire service into 
domestic intelligence sharing? 
c. Is a national solution the best answer? 
d. How comprehensive should a national solution be? 
2. What is the future of intelligence sharing with the fire service? 
a. What is the role of technology? 
b. What role does suspicious activity reporting play? 
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With these questions in mind, policies and plans related to intelligence sharing 
with SLT entities were examined and compared. In addition, current trends and 
information relating to how intelligence and information is currently shared among fire 
departments and with members of the IC and nodes, such as fusion centers, was part of 






















IV. DISCUSSION  
Currently there is no uniform system for information/intelligence sharing 
throughout the entire fire service. As a result, different methods of 
information/intelligence sharing exist, with no concerted effort of outreach across 
departments is in practice.  
A. WHY IS THE FIRE SERVICE IMPORTANT IN INTELLIGENCE? 
1. General Advantages of Information Sharing 
Consistently when speaking of or about information/intelligence sharing with the 
fire service the question “why” is usually raised. This is a question that begs answering 
for not only the fire service but other groups, public and private sector, with public safety 
responsibilities. In the following list of advantages of sharing information, one could 
make an argument of replacing “fire” with emergency management or public health: 
• Increased Public Safety by making timely, accurate and complete public 
safety information available to all fire service decision makers. 
• Improved Accuracy of information by having data available to all fire 
services. 
• Implement information-driven and risk-based detection, prevention, 
deterrence, response, protection and emergency management efforts. 
• Identify rapidly both immediate and long-term threats.42 
In addition to the fire specific justification presented in the fire service appendix 
to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center,s the 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) also listed the 
advantages to fire service information sharing.  
                                                 
42 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders.” 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C., 2011, 8–9. 
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2. Advantages to Fire Service Information Sharing 
As our Nation’s first “preventers and responders,” along with being the primary 
first mitigators of most domestic emergencies and incidents, fire service personnel are 
critical to our efforts to protect the homeland and to respond if an incident occurs. The 
fire service must have access to the information that enables them to protect our local 
communities. In addition, fire officials are often best able to identify potential threats or 
anomalies that exist within their jurisdictions. The fire service has a high degree of 
personal interaction with the public and an acute situational awareness within the 
communities they serve. The fire service is a full and trusted partner with the federal 
government in our Nation’s efforts to protect and respond to incidents involving our 
nation’s critical infrastructure, and therefore, they must be a part of an information 
sharing framework that supports an effective and efficient two-way flow of information 
enabling officials at all levels of government to counter and respond to threats.  
a. Fire Service Public Interaction and Education  
The role the fire service plays in fire prevention and public education can 
include the enforcement of building codes through inspections. This and other fire 
prevention functions allow the fire service to gain access to information not commonly 
possessed by other members of the homeland security enterprise (e.g., floor plans, 
inventories of hazardous materials, and building occupants). Public education allows the 
fire service an avenue for public interaction to disseminate information, and gain valuable 
insight to the community and how to best serve the community. An example of a national 
public education program, as it applies to information collection is “see something say 
something.” “See something say something’s purpose is to raise public awareness of 
indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, and to emphasize the importance of 




                                                 
43 United States Department of Homeland Security, n.d. http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-
say-something-campaign (accessed August 22, 2012).  
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b. Fire Service Public Interactions via EMS 
The fire service and fire departments with integrated EMS respond to 
hundreds of thousands of response calls a year, resulting in contact with people and 
dwellings not covered by fire prevention code enforcement. In addition, these EMS assets 
would be the first to detect the signs and symptoms of chemical or biological attacks, if 
those attacks are not self-announcing or clandestine in nature. 
c. How Information Sharing Benefits the Fire Service 
The fire service can both provide information and intelligence to the IC 
and benefit from information and intelligence disseminated from the IC. In their 
“Intelligence Guide for first Responders,” the Interagency Threat Assessment and 
Coordination Group (ITACG) espoused eight (8) points of what intelligence can do or 
provide.44  Point one reads, “Decision advantage, by presenting information and analysis 
that can improve the decision-making process for consumers and partners while 
hindering that of our enemies.”45 In planning for preplanned events, and self-announcing 
incidents (an incident that can be foreseen as possibly occurring with the time and/or date 
of occurrence being completely spontaneous.), day-to-day operations, and incident 
mitigation; additional information and knowledge, coupled with experience, can alter 
decisions and actions, while improving outcomes. This “decision advantage” in terms of 
self-announcing incidents leads to another attribute of intelligence—“Situational 
Awareness.”46 Situational awareness is important for fire departments to know the whole 
picture not only for mitigation but also indicators of terrorist activity. Indicators can 
present in any number of ways from an EMS call, while conducting a fire prevention 
inspection, fire company response district familiarization, or a fire company performing 
target hazard assessments. 
                                                 
44 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 




The importance of situational awareness is also clearly articulated by the 
first fire department to delve into the issue of why the fire service has a need for access to 
information/intelligence from? the Fire Department of New York City. In the FDNY 
Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy, the importance of situational awareness 
reads as such, “Real-time intelligence and information lead to a heightened state of 
situational awareness, which is imperative in both the planning and responding stages of 
operations. In reaction to information gathered and based on the type of intelligence 
received, the FDNY can increase inspection activity to assist in detection or strategically 
locate additional resources to act as a terrorism deterrent.”47 In addition, as many other 
documents have been written about this topic, a recent thesis on the subject of situational 
awareness writes “Through the sharing of pre-incident information and intelligence, and 
real-time incident updates, situational awareness will be enhanced to support both local 
fire departments and DHS’s preparedness efforts. Rapid and comprehensive information 
sharing will also be imperative to establishing a common operational picture on the local 
and national levels during a major incident.”48 
d. Benefits to Planning and Training 
In addition, four things intelligence can “do” that affects fire service 
planning and training are, “Warning of potential threats, Insight into key current events, 
Long-term strategic assessments on issues of ongoing interest, Reports on specific topics, 
either as part of ongoing reporting or upon request for short-term needs.”49Intelligence 
involving those topics can affect long-term fire service training as to what CBRNE 
methods should members be trained to mitigate, based on threats. In addition, what 
potential targets within a fire department’s jurisdiction can be derived based on current 
events. Furthermore, reports on specific topic can be included with germane training 
evolutions and/or documents.  
                                                 
47 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy.” New York, 
New York, 2007, 20. 
48 Rosemary Cloud, “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security.” Monterey, California: Naval 
Postgraduate School, September 2008. 
49 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders.” 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C., 2011, 8–9. 
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Of the ODNI’s points, as restated by the ITACG, of what intelligence can 
do, two of the points apply: (1) “Pre-travel security overviews and support, and (2) 
Knowledge on persons of interest involve either someone’s personal information or travel 
do not support the value that can be added by intelligence to the fire service.50 Both 
personal information and travel alerts do not fall clearly into the operations or mission of 
the fire service.  
An example of using information, not intelligence, comes in the form of 
what focus limited planning resources would have. By way of example, the annual 
worldwide threat assessment from the Director of National Intelligence stated: “The IC 
judges that lone actors abroad or in the United States—including criminals and 
homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by terrorist leaders or literature 
advocating use of CBR materials—are capable of conducting at least limited attacks in 
the next year, but we assess the anthrax threat to the United States by lone actors is 
low.”51  In light of this statement, a fire department may, if faced with a choice between 
where to focus planning over the next year, choose to focus more on CBR as opposed to 
anthrax, if after a threat analysis HVE has a history and/or is rated high in as a threat to 
their jurisdiction. 
3. What Intelligence Cannot Do for the Fire Service 
Just as those outside of the fire service can learn about the value added to 
information/intelligence sharing, the fire service needs to understand what the access to 
intelligence cannot necessarily provide or solve. Access to security clearances in order to 
access intelligence related products is a complicated process, bound by rules and limited 
by policies that require need-to-know information, in addition to the means by which it 
was collected and sourced. That burden of responsibility cannot be equally shared across 
the service. Just as there are things that intelligence can do, there are things that 
                                                 
50 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders.” 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C., 2011, 8–9. 
51 James R. Clapper, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of 
the U.S. Intelligence Community for theSenate Select Committee on Intelligence.” Statement for the 
Record.Washington, D.C., January 31, 2012, 2. 
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intelligence cannot do. The ODNI stressed that the things intelligence cannot do list 
reflects that, “Realistic expectations will help consumers fill their intelligence needs.”52 
Realistic expectations are important for not only current consumers of intelligence but 
future consumers of intelligence. Understanding the limitations of access to intelligence 
related products is a fundamental first step towards eliminating misperceptions; and 
developing a realistic, operationally sound practice for the fire service. For example: 
Intelligence, cannot: 
• Predict the future. Intelligence can provide assessments of likely scenarios 
or developments, but there is no way to predict what will happen with 
absolute certainty. 
• Violate U.S. law. The activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) must 
be conducted consistent with all applicable laws and executive orders, to 
include the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA); the Privacy Act of 1974; the Detainee Treatment 
Act; Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended; Executive Order 
12333; and the Military Commission Act.53 
B. INTEGRATION APPROACHES 
In terms of the United States IC, which approaches intelligence from a national 
strategic perspective, 30,000 feet above what applies to the first fire engine arriving at a 
fire, “Homeland security intelligence could be viewed as primarily a federal activity.”54 
Under this strictly federally structured, and statutorily mandated, approach; “Geography 
is not as important …, as the federal entities that engage in homeland security 
intelligence may, directly or indirectly, collect information outside the United States.”55 
As this discussion examines collection and dissemination of information on a local level, 
there are two possible approaches, as written by Todd Masse in a document for the 
                                                 
52 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2011.” 
Washington, D.C., 2011, 40. 
53 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders.” 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C., 2011, 8–9. 
54 Todd Masse, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006, 16. 
55 Ibid. 
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Congressional Research Service, titled “Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, 
Statutory Definitions, and Approaches.”56 Those approaches are the Geographic 
Approach and the Holistic Approach. 
1. Geographic Approach to Integration  
Under the Geographic Approach, Masse opines: “Homeland security intelligence 
can be viewed, some might argue rather simplistically, in geographic and 
federal/state/local government terms. That is, if the intelligence collection activity takes 
place within the United States—whether it be by a federal agency or a state, local, tribal, 
or private sector actor, it would be considered HSINT.”57 Under this approach, fire 
service information/intelligence sharing governance and/or structure would be governed 
strictly by political division and subdivision. Although the geographic approach is a good 
method for integration of small and medium sized fire departments, by using a regional 
concept, this method in and of itself may not best serve the fire service. Portions of the 
fire service exist that have no allegiance to one political subdivision, for example, fire 
protection districts and mutual aid organizations. Fire departments are found to be formed 
on the county level of government, municipal level of government, township level, and 
by agreed upon compact. Fire departments arising out of agreed upon compacts are the 
result of units of government that decide to share responsibility of funding fire protection 
and form a fire protection district. The fire protection district is responsible to a board and 
not one particular unit of government. Fire departments have a diverse number of 
possible political organs that could have formed a particular department. A fire 
department can even respond to or be responsible for areas that house different fusion 
centers, and or, include more than one state, as a result of mutual aid responsibilities. As 
a result of no universal political governance structure that would be applicable to all fire 
departments, elected political subdivisions may not be adequate as a  
 
 
                                                 
56 Todd Masse, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006, 15. 
57 Ibid. 
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sole means to address information and intelligence sharing integration. As a result, the 
FEMA Regions should take a more active role in integrating the fire service into 
information/intelligence sharing.  
2. Holistic Approach to Integration 
Masse’s Holistic Approach ignores political implications entirely and their 
geographic constraints as he writes, “Under this approach, HSINT is not bounded by 
geographic constraints, level of government, or perceived mutual mistrust between public 
and private sectors. That is, the approach recognizes no borders and is neither “top down” 
nor “bottom up”… It involves and values equally information collected by the U.S. 
private sector owners of national critical infrastructure, intelligence related to national 
security collected by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers, as well as 
the traditional “Ints” collected by statutory members of the IC.”58 This more flexible 
approach is better suited for a diverse and divergent group such as the fire service. Yet, 
this approach ignores the natural benefits of relationships between large government 
agencies and large political organs. In addition, the leverage and importance of large 
political organizations is not fully exploited. 
Both the geographic and holistic approaches are extreme opposites, have merit in 
application, and work in different circumstances. Perhaps a case-by-case application of 
both is the best approach to using these methods? The important part of both is: one, they 
are not mutually exclusive, and two, they shift the HSINT focus away from the 30,000 
foot federal level. The shift in approach from a 30,000 foot national (strategic) level to 
20,000 foot regional (operational) level, 10,000 foot local (tactical) level or as others 
should examine, the street level. This is further bolstered by Charles K. Edwards’ 
Inspector General’s report “DHS' Efforts to Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and 
Information Sharing with Fusion Centers,” where it is retold that, “on September 10, 
2010, the Secretary addressed first responders at the New York City Emergency 
Operations Center, explaining the department’s shift to a “hometown-centric” approach. 
                                                 
58 Todd Masse, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006, 17. 
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By getting departmental information, tools, and resources to first responders, citizens, 
community groups, and the private sector, DHS can be more effective. The National 
Network of Fusion Centers is crucial to this effort.59 There are two important pieces to 
this anecdote. First, the Secretary’s mention of “hometown-centric approach” places 
value on local partnerships and exchanging of information. Second, the Secretary stated 
the local partners as “first responders, citizens, community groups, and the private sector” 
a wide array of untapped resources, especially in light of the struggles of including first 
responders outside of law enforcement. None the less, this is a clear indication that 
information/intelligence sharing expansion is validated as a priority at the highest level of 
DHS.  
C. INTEGRATION INPUTS AND PRODUCTS 
Prior to DHS, domestic intelligence dissemination was the purview of the FBI and 
JTTF. As a result, many fire departments may have developed relationships with the FBI 
and JTTF, for information/intelligence sharing. These relationships may or may not have 
been a reflection on local law enforcement as much as a cutting out the middle man and 
in order to receive timely and accurate intelligence. In relation to the evolution of DHS 
and its statutory authority related to the dissemination of information/intelligence to state 
and local government, through fusion centers; organizations may not fully understand the 
important role of JTTFs and other information/intelligence nodes that predate fusion 
centers. Using information from the ITACG, this section will begin by distinguishing 
between the JTTF and fusion centers. Next, other information/intelligence nodes will be 
presented. Finally, information/intelligence products produced by nodes and agencies 
will be listed. 
In general, “JTTFs are FBI-sponsored, multijurisdictional task forces established 
specifically to conduct terrorism-related investigations. Analytic and information-sharing 
efforts carried out by the JTTFs are done solely to support those investigative efforts. 
Also, each FBI office contains a Field Intelligence Group, which is the main interlocutor 
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of Homeland Security, November 2011, 14. 
 34
with the fusion center. Fusion centers, in contrast, are information sharing and analytic 
entities and do not focus solely on terrorism. They are state and locally owned and 
operated information analysis centers that analyze information and intelligence regarding 
a broad array of criminal and other activities related to homeland security. Fusion centers 
focus on trend and pattern analysis that is intended to help state and local law 
enforcement mitigate emerging crime problems, including terrorism and other threats to 
homeland security.”60 In the definitions of both the JTTF and fusion centers, both are 
strictly defined as crime based, one all crimes (Fusion) and one strictly terrorism related 
(JTTF). 
Specifically, per the ITACG, below is a description of recognized nodes or 
intuitional inputs: 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): JTTFs serve as the coordinated “action 
arms” for federal, state, and local government response to terrorist threats in specific U.S. 
geographic regions. The FBI is the lead agency that oversees JTTFs. The benefits of a 
JTTF include: 
• “one-stop shopping” for law enforcement information or investigation of 
suspected or real terrorist activities; 
• use of a shared intelligence base; 
• ability to prosecute cases in the jurisdiction that is most efficient and 
effective; 
• task-force member awareness of investigations within a jurisdiction and 
ability to assist in investigations in other jurisdictions; and 
• familiarity among agencies, investigators, and managers before a crisis 
occurs.61 
The mission of a JTTF is to leverage the collective resources of the member 
agencies for the prevention, preemption, deterrence, and investigation of terrorist acts that 
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affect United States interests, to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts, and to apprehend 
individuals who may commit or plan to commit such acts. To further this mission, a JTTF 
serves as a means to facilitate information sharing among JTTF members. 
• As of January 2011, there are 104 JTTFs based nationwide, including at 
least one in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices. 
• More than 600 state and local agencies participate in JTTFs nationwide. 
Federal representation includes the U.S. Intelligence Community, the 
Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Treasury, 
Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and Interior, among others.62 
Fusion Centers: A fusion center is a dedicated element, run by the applicable 
state or local jurisdiction, that exchanges information and intelligence, maximizes 
resources, streamlines operations, and improves the ability to disrupt, prevent, respond to, 
and recover from all threats by analyzing data from a variety of sources. A fusion center 
is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, 
expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing a center’s ability to 
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.” Fusion centers 
focus primarily on the intelligence and fusion processes through which information is 
gathered, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated. State and major urban area 
fusion centers provide analysis and information-sharing capabilities that support the 
efforts of state and local law enforcement to prevent and investigate crime and terrorism. 
Fusion centers receive information from a variety of sources, including state and local 
tips and leads, as well as federal information and intelligence. By “fusing” information 
from a wide variety of disciplines to conduct analysis, fusion centers generate products 
that are timely and relevant to their customers’ needs. This allows state and local law 
enforcement to address immediate and emerging threat-related circumstances and events. 
It also supports risk-based, information-driven prevention, response, and consequence 
management. 
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• As of January 2011, there are 72 designated fusion centers (50 state and 22 
Major Urban Areas). 
• Fusion centers are designed to involve every level and discipline of 
government, private-sector entities, and the public—though the level of 
involvement of some participants will vary. 
• Fusion centers are state and locally owned and operated. The Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) has a statutory program to support fusion 
centers.63 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)):The mission of the NJTTF is 
to enhance communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and 
local government agencies representing the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, 
diplomatic, public safety, transportation, and homeland security communities by 
providing a point of fusion for terrorism intelligence and by supporting the JTTFs 
throughout the United States. 
• The NJTTF was established in July 2002 to serve as a coordinating 
mechanism with the FBI’s partners. 
• As of January 2011, forty-nine agencies are represented in the NJTTF, 
which has become a focal point for information sharing and the 
management of large-scale projects that involve multiple partners.64 
National Operations Center (NOC): The mission of the NOC is to serve as the 
primary national level hub for domestic situational awareness, common operating picture, 
information fusion, information sharing, communications, and operations coordination 
pertaining to the prevention of terrorist’s attacks and domestic incident management. The 
NOC serves as the nation’s nerve center for information collection and sharing. Pursuant 
to Section 515 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the NOC is the principal 
operations center for DHS. As the principal operations center, Congress tasked the NOC 
with performing two key responsibilities: 
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• First, the NOC shall provide situational awareness and a common 
operating picture for the entire federal government, and for state, local, 
and tribal governments as appropriate, in the event of a natural disaster, 
act of terrorism, or other manmade disaster. 
• Second, the NOC shall ensure that critical terrorism and disaster-related 
information reaches government decision makers.  
By performing its mission, the NOC enables the Secretary DHS and other leaders 
to make informed decisions and identify courses of action during an event or threat. The 
Secretary has assigned the NOC to the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning (OPS). The NOC is comprised of five operational components: the NOC-
Watch, Federal Emergency Management Agency National Response Coordination Center 
(NRCC), DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis/Intelligence Watch and Warning Branch and the OPS Planning 
Element. Each NOC operational component remains an independent entity under the 
program management of its parent DHS Component. By drawing upon and leveraging 
the authorities and capabilities of each NOC operational component, the NOC—as a 
cohesive and integrated whole—serves as the primary national hub for situational 
awareness and operations coordination across the federal government for incident 
management and as the national fusion center, collecting and synthesizing all-source 
information, including information from the state fusion centers, across all-threats and all 
hazards information covering the spectrum of homeland security partners.65 
In addition to the physical nodes for information/intelligence, there are also 
virtual nodes, such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO). With these, and other, virtual nodes comes For Official Use 
Only ( FOUO) information, typically available to first responders, and classified 
information, available to those with proper clearance located at a physical node. For 
example, first responders with the appropriate level of clearance and access can view 
classified information on National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—currently, the DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis portal, and other sites on SECRET level systems, 
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such as FBI Network (FBINet), Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), Joint 
Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), and Secure Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNet).66 
Realistically, the vast majority of the fire service has little need to know the 
sources and methods resulting in a piece of intelligence, thereby, negating the need for 
TOP SECRET clearances. Although, certain time sensitive classified intelligence 
warrants key decision makers possessing at a minimum of a SECRET clearance. Absent a 
mature integrated intelligence program, possibly TLO based, clearances below the 
highest command levels would be a justification for another thesis. Typically, the 
products the fire service should expect are FOUO and may fall into different categories. 
The categories disseminated by the IC domestically are Information Reports, Intelligence 
Assessments (IA), Intelligence Bulletins (IB), Threat Assessments (TA) or Special 
Assessments (SA).67 
Per the ITACG, below is a brief description of each report type: 
Information Reports are messages that enable the timely dissemination of 
unevaluated intelligence within the Intelligence Community and law enforcement. These 
products include: 
• FBI IIR (Intelligence Information Report) 
• DHS HIR (Homeland Information Report) 
Intelligence Assessments (IA) are finished intelligence products resulting from 
the intelligence analysis process. Assessments may address tactical, strategic, or technical 
intelligence requirements. 
Intelligence Bulletins (IB) are finished intelligence products used to disseminate 
information of interest, such as significant developments and trends, to the intelligence 
and law enforcement communities in an article format. IBs do not address threat warning 
information. 
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Threat Assessments (TA) or Special Assessments (SA) provide in-depth 
analyses related to a specific event or body of threat reporting and may address non-
terrorist threats to national security. 
Joint Products are intelligence assessments and bulletins produced jointly with 
other agencies (dual or multiple seals). When written jointly, these products may be 
formatted differently than the single-seal versions, depending on the format agreed to by 
participating agencies.68 
Finally, in addition to different report types specific summaries that may provide 
value to the fire service are below: 
Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB). The JIB provides timely information or 
analysis on a recent or current event or development of interest to all information and 
analysis customers and is produced at various classification levels. It focuses on 
Homeland Security issues, is written on an ad hoc basis, and is generally one to three 
pages. It is available on HSIN, LEO, or HSDN, depending on the classification of the 
information. 
Roll Call Release (RCR). Available on HSIN and LEO, the RCR is a 
collaborative For Official Use only (FOUO) product developed by DHS, FBI, and the 
ITACG. The product is written specifically for state, local, and tribal “street-level” first 
responders, and focuses on terrorist tactics, techniques, procedures; terrorism trends; and 
potential indicators of suspicious activity. The product, written on an ad hoc basis, is 
focused on one subject, and fits on one page. 
Terrorism Summary (TERRSUM).The TERRSUM is a SECRET digest of 
terrorism related intelligence of interest to federal and non-federal law enforcement, 
security and military personnel. Produced Monday through Friday, the TERRSUM 
includes terrorism-related intelligence available to NCTC and other Intelligence  
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Community elements. The product is available on SECRET-level systems to 
appropriately cleared personnel at state and major urban area fusion centers and Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces. 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS).WITS is the U.S. government’s 
authoritative database on terrorist attacks compiled exclusively from open source 
information. Maintained by the NCTC, WITS is publicly available at www.nctc.gov. 
Users can search for attack data and sort it by a broad range of characteristics, to include 
type of attack, location, facility, perpetrator, and other attributes. Users also can plot 
incidents on maps using Google Earth and Google Map. State, local, and tribal law 
enforcement and first responders use WITS to track terrorist trends, support event 
planning, and provide context for terrorist activities.69 
Above a number of nodes, databases, and products have been presented. Each of 
these nodes, databases, and products represent either a method or source of information 
that an individual fire department can utilize to share or gain information and 
intelligence. The diversity of options can be utilized by a diverse number of fire 
departments. These diverse departments with different resource levels and different 
formal relationships can use the above as possible starting points or fodder for ideas as to 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In devising a new strategy for fire service information sharing, the main elements 
of the DHS Intelligence Strategy provided a road map. The main elements are: Vision, 
Mission, 
Definitions, and Goals and Objectives.70 
The primary statutory definition that applies is that which appears in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which defines homeland security 
information as any information possessed by a federal, state, or local 
agency that (a) relates to the threat of terrorist activity, (b) relates to the 
ability to prevent, interdict or disrupt terrorist activity, (c) would improve 
the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist 
organization; or (d) would improve the response to a terrorist act.71 
A. STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends the facilitation of bottom up inclusion of the fire service 
in information and intelligence sharing through access to intelligence nodes. The strategy 
to implement a new system for fire service integration into domestic 
information/intelligence sharing needs to address current and emerging threats. This 
strategy should allow for improved and timely information/intelligence, as well as 
facilitate the flow of this information to all partners—state, local, tribal or federal, with 
the objective of providing a roadmap for individual fire departments to establish a bi-
directional information conduit between the fire service and DHS.  
Based on current grassroots networks and existing relationships, fire departments 
could have the option to use FEMA Regions, hegemonic fire departments with resources 
and relationships, law enforcement entities having interaction with fusion centers or 
through relationships gained through mutual aid agreements. Hegemonic fire departments 
are departments with the resources and capabilities to assist departments regionally, and 
in extreme circumstances nationally, in mitigating incidents they may lack the personnel 
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or capability to mitigate. In addition, hegemonic have the resources to be national leaders 
in research, development, and beta testing new concepts. Optimally, this would be 
legitimized and codified per a national directive, which mandates the alignment of federal 
coordination, structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-
hazards approach to domestic information management. An example of such a directive 
would be a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD). For example, PPD addresses National 
Preparedness coordination across discipline.72 A codified national directive would be 
consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing, which states, “Authorities 
at all levels of our federal system must share a common understanding of the information 
needed to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks.73  The common understanding 
will be achieved through a framework that enables: (1)  Federal entities to work together 
to provide information in ways that better meet the needs of state, local and tribal 
partners; and (2) Information gathered at the state and local level to be processed, 
analyzed, disseminated, and integrated with information gathered at the federal level.”  
1. Recommendation: Development of System 
It is the goal that organic nodes will develop, through grassroots efforts that will 
allow information to flow as a result of existing organization relationships, as opposed to 
through a nationally mandated system. Systems theory shows the power and resiliency of 
a network, if the number of nodes is increased. A more resilient system will withstand 
stress by its redundancy and plasticity “to absorb shocks and rechanneling its efforts to 
remain intact.”74 For instance, Metcalf’s Law states the power of a network increases 
exponentially to the amount of linked nodes.75 (See Figure 3).Furthermore, robust 
interconnected networks allow for speed of movement and more effective 
decisionmaking allowing choices to be made on the level where choices are most 
immediately felt and information is either used or gathered. In other words, a “distributed 
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structure” that permits timely decisions made by those closest and most familiar to the 
issue rather than through a cumbersome wait engendered by a hierarchal command 
geographically removed from the scene.76 
 
Figure 3.   Three Basic Types of Networks.77 
In the proposed Fire Service Information Sharing System, there are no 
predestinated central nodes. Under the FSIE, the fifteen (15) departments were intended 
to become central nodes in a network that would expand beyond the fifteen partners to 
their surrounding localities. In the Fire Service Information Sharing System, the onus is 
placed on individual departments to decide the best network to join and at what level of 
engagement. Each individual department can determine their level of engagement 
depending upon their need and capabilities. The level of engagement, or decision not to 
become engaged, by departments is at individual departments sole discretion  
The transference of integration of responsibility to the lowest levels of the system 
avoids the issues having a system of like nodes (departments with similar capabilities and 
similar size) that could lead to a tiered system of nodes based upon department sizes, 
organization (e.g., volunteer vs. career) and capabilities. In addition, nodes formed 
organically with different access points does not result in a single point of failure or 
reliance upon a single place for interaction (e.g., HSIN) and a single program sponsor 
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(e.g., DHS I&A or FBI). As a result of different fire department sizes, organization, and 
capability one person or one group being responsible for the Fire Service Information 
Sharing System may not be effective or capable of representing all. Therefore, each 
department is empowered to represent themselves in becoming engaged in the Fire 
Service Information Sharing System. 
Arquilla writes that networks are “measured across five levels of analysis: 
• Organizational level-its organizational design; 
• Narrative level-the story being told; 
• Doctrinal level-the collaborative strategies and methods; 
• Technological level-the information systems; 
• Social level-the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust.78 
Furthermore, “The strength of a network, perhaps especially the all-channel 
design, depends on its functioning well across all five levels. The strongest networks will 
be those in which the organizational design sustains by a winning story and a well-
defined doctrine, and in which all of this layers atop advanced communication systems 
and rests on strong personal ties at the base. Each level, and the overall design, may 
benefit from redundancy and diversity. Each level’s characteristics are likely to affect 
those of the other levels.”79 
As the system develops and evolves, it should be measured against Arquilla’s 
levels of analysis. Based upon the ongoing analysis, the system can be adjusted and 
improved. This would be affective as analysis would be based on actual outcomes as 
opposed basing the system on analysis of predicted possible outcomes. For example, the 
FSIE focused on HSIN as the technological level solution. With technology ever 
changing and the diverse level of technological infrastructure throughout the Fire Service, 
a predetermined solution was not and will not be effective. Furthermore, a grassroots 
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based system would have an increased chance of success on a social level, as preexisting 
organizational relationships, and by extension personal ties, can be leveraged to form a 
network node. Yet, regardless of how the node and relationships are formed and the 
system evolves, there needs to be given a clear vision and expectations for fire service 
integration. Therefore, a mission and goals will be articulated.   
2. Recommended Mission and Goals 
a. Mission 
The United States Fire Administration will create and maintain documents 
and supporting policies to facilitate collaboration with accurate, complete, and timely 
flow of information on fire service issues.  
b. Vision 
Foster a collaborative environment that will facilitate the fire service using 
organizational relationships with either their FEMA Region or existing law enforcement 
collaborators for information/intelligence sharing and eventually suspicious activity 
reporting. As a result of research into the work done by the FSIE, realistic goals can be 
transferred. 
c. Goals 
(1) Institute Uniform Information Sharing Framework. This 
goal focuses on providing guidance to FEMA Regions and Law Enforcement entities as 
to coordination of information sharing with fire departments: 
• Develop a framework to increase information sharing 
across the fire service community and with state, local and 
federal partners. 
• Mechanisms to instill common avenues of integration 
practices for organizations facilitating intelligence and 
information sharing between fire departments and fusion 
centers. 
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• Reduce risks to civil liberty and privacy infractions from 
greater information sharing. 
• Assist uniform information/intelligence sharing knowledge 
and capabilities through the availability of training 
programs and model standards for fire department use in 
developing internal sharing policies and procedures. 
• The integration of fire departments should be 
complementary to “fusion centers” but not exclusionary 
tied to “fusion centers” as the only avenue for interaction. 
(2)  Advance Fire Service Intelligence Requirements. The FSIE 
and its working group, with support and assistance from DHS I&A, developed a working 
set of intelligence requirements for the fire service: 
• Revisit and review requirements and update, if necessary. 
• Distribute the fire service requirements to all fusion centers 
and applicable IC members for use by analysts. 
• Develop fire service requirement training for intelligence 
analysts working or wishing to work in fusion centers. 
(3) Enhance Collaboration across the Community. 
Collaboration was a constant theme across the research and in most official policy 
documents. This goal focuses on developing incentives (e.g., at the institutional, 
leadership, and workforce levels) for collaboration with fire service community by all 
levels of law enforcement and FEMA regions to instill the “responsibility to provide” 
culture, share knowledge and provide expertise: 
• Develop information sharing communication programs to 
create awareness of a “responsibility to provide” culture. 
• Create programs to transform the culture from a “need to 
know” to a “responsibility to provide” mindset. 
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• Allow grass roots sharing initiatives to flourish between 
fire departments through the conduits determined to be 
most appropriate and expedient, for both individual fire 
departments and their link to the fusion center/partner.  
• Provide smart practices and success stories of the different 
methods used by fire departments to gain access to 
intelligence/information. 
• Each FEMA Region will be responsible for monitoring and 
assisting/facilitating, if necessary, the partnering of fire 
departments with an organization engaged in the fusion 
process. 
• Integration would focus on using any available point of 
contact not just one, examples of different points of contact 
are shown in Figure 4:80 
 
Figure 4.   Flow of Information to and from the IC to SLT. 
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3. Recommended Strategic Plan 
This framework for multiple avenues for access to information/intelligence shares 
the same core principles as the previous, FSIE: 
• Effective information sharing comes through strong partnerships among 
federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, and private sector organizations; 
• Information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, 
might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with 
applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources, 
and therefore a culture of awareness in which people at all levels of 
government remain cognizant of the functions and needs of others and use 
knowledge and information from all sources to support mutual efforts to 
protect the homeland must be fostered; 
• Information sharing must be woven into all aspects of fire service activity, 
including preventive and protective actions, actionable responses, event 
preparedness, and response to and recovery from catastrophic events;  
• The procedures, processes, and systems that support information sharing 
must draw upon and integrate existing technical capabilities and must 
respect established authorities and responsibilities; and 
• Develop training, awareness, and exercise programs to ensure that State, 
local, and tribal personnel are prepared to deal with terrorist strategies, 
tactics, capabilities, and intentions, and to test plans for preventing, 
preparing for, mitigating the effects of, and responding to all-hazard 
events. 
The strategy for achieving the mission and goals involves leveraging the positive 
work and documents from the FSIE. In addition to using all authorities, resources, 
programs, and capabilities of FSIE, participants can assist in the execution of this plan as 
effectively as possible and to promote a culture where sharing all-hazards information is 
a core value. 
Therefore, the operating environment that flows from this vision and these goals 
will draw upon existing systems and capabilities, observe and respect the roles and 
responsibilities of participating federal entities, and facilitate a coordinated, collaborative 
approach to appropriate information sharing among the entire fire service. This 
environment will create a powerful national capability to share, search, and analyze threat 
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information across jurisdictional boundaries and provide a distributed, secure, and trusted 
environment for transforming data into actionable information. The resulting 
environment will also recognize and leverage the vital roles played by state and major 
urban area information fusion centers, which represent crucial investments toward 
improving the nation’s all-hazards capacity. 
4. Summary 
The successful implementation of this plan has the potential to create an 
environment in which all fire departments have an opportunity to pursue an avenue for 
information/intelligence sharing. By not mandating a one size fits all, one point of access 
to fit the disparate fire service information/intelligence sharing can grow from the grass 
roots level and be met half way by naturally allied organizations with access to 
information/intelligence and achieving the stated purpose, goals, and objectives: to enable 
fire service partnerships, enhance the lawful sharing of information, and to coordinate 
interactions with state and local fusion centers. At this end state, the fire service will have 
information that is timely and can potentially influence actions to be taken, have 
information tailored to the needs of individual participants—the right information 
provided at the right time, over the right pathways—and have information that can be 
exchanged within the system of rules established to protect that information. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY  
In terms of information/intelligence sharing, the FSIE brought the fire service a 
long way, in terms of producing the foundation documents needed for integration. Yet 
there is still work that remains to be done. This thesis examined options at a 10,000 foot 
level for organizational sharing; however, that is only a first step in an important process 
bound with obstacles for acceptance in the information sharing domain that will require 
fundamental shifts in organizational culture. The scope of this endeavor limited the 
thorough examination of departmental operational implementation, including TLOs and 
security clearances. The universal key to any future initiative or proposal requires 
flexibility in order to be assimilated into fire culture, theory and practice and cannot be 
initially strictly tech based.  
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In light of the research for this document, the author pointed to two large topics 
suffering from volumes of ever changing information.  
C. LEVERAGING CURRENT TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE 
As presented in the discussion section, there are a wide variety of systems and 
products accessible to various levels of responders, officials and agencies. To supplement 
existing systems, individual fusion centers and other nodes may have systems for 
dissemination and collection. This is a topic in and of itself meriting study. Yet, with ever 
evolving technology, any technological solution needs to be adaptable and scalable. By 
nature, the fire service and its 150 years unimpeded by progress is technology averse. In 
addition, older urban areas may not have the technological backbone to support a robust 
information sharing system.  
A possible solution would be to design specific platforms over or in conjunction 
with existing platforms. Such existing platforms are computer aided dispatch (CAD) and 
existing email distribution systems. As opposed to creating an entirely new system, CAD 
can be the backbone for an information delivery and transmission system. This solution 
also limits the unauthorized access or abuse of the system. A CAD based system would 
be physically tied to fire apparatus and fire houses. Furthermore, most CAD systems are 
closed loop, restricting external access, while allowing for information to be pushed to a 
partner node. How individual portals are constructed is a matter of department 
preference. Below are examples of existing information networks from which ideas can 
be gleamed. 
Intelink-U. Intelink-U is the Intelligence Community’s (IC) sensitive but 
unclassified-sharing network. Content is provided by the IC, other government agencies, 
foreign partners, academia, and open sources. Accounts are available to individuals with 
federal, state, local, and tribal homeland security and law enforcement responsibilities. 
• Web site: https://www.intelink.gov. 
• Access: Go to web site, click on “Sign In,” and proceed to “New 
Account Registration.” 
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Law Enforcement Online (LEO). LEO can be accessed from any computer 
system with an Internet connection. It is an official government information-sharing and 
electronic-communications portal. LEO provides FBI, joint FBI-DHS, NCTC, and 
nonfederally produced intelligence products at the For Official Use Only (FOUO) level. 
Accounts are available to federal, state, local, and tribal personnel performing homeland 
security or law enforcement duties and personnel from foreign law enforcement agencies. 
• Web site: http://www.leo.gov 
• Access: Go to web site, click on the “LEO Membership Criteria,” then the 
“LEO 
• User Application,” or contact the LEO helpdesk at 1-888-334-4536, or via 
e-mail at helpdesk@leo.gov 
OpenSource.gov. The Open Source Center (OSC) and its partners provide timely 
and tailored translations, reporting, and analysis on foreign policy and national security 
issues. Featured are reports and translations from thousands of publications, television 
and radio stations, and Internet sources around the world. Also among the site’s holdings 
are a foreign video archive and fee-based commercial databases for which OSC has 
negotiated licenses. OSC’s reach extends from hard-to-find local publications and video 
to some of the most renowned thinkers on national security issues inside and outside the 
U.S. government. Accounts are available to federal, state, and local government 
employees and contractors. 
• Web site: http://www.opensource.gov. 
• Access: Apply online via web site. 
Regional Information Sharing Systems Network (RISSNET). RISSNET 
facilitates information sharing within the law enforcement community to combat 
multijurisdictional criminal activities and conspiracies. It is composed of six multistate 
intelligence centers (RISS Intelligence Centers). Membership includes federal, state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.  
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• Access is requested through the regional RISS Intelligence Centers 
• Web site: http://www.riss.net 
• Contact information available at http://www.riss.net/Centers.aspx 
Technical Resources for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire).TRIPwire is the 
Department of Homeland Security’s 24/7 online, secure, collaborative, information-sharing 
network for bomb squad, law enforcement, and other emergency services personnel to learn 
about current terrorist Improvised Explosive Device (IED) tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, including design and emplacement considerations. TRIPwire combines expert 
analysis and reports with relevant documents, images, and videos gathered directly from 
terrorist sources to help law enforcement anticipate, identify, and prevent IED incidents. 
• Web site: https://www.tripwire.dhs.gov. 
• Access: For more information about the TRIPwire system, please contact 
the Office for Bombing Prevention at OBP@dhs.gov or through the 
TRIPwire help desk at help@ tripwire-dhs.net81 
In addition to the development of a system, internal policies and procedures need 
to be developed on a department by department basis in conjunction with their sharing 
partner or node. To assist in forming individual policies and the following links may be 
of assistance and are valid as of January 2011.  
• Guidance for Building Communities of Trust 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/e071021293_BuildingCommTrust_v2-
August%2016.pdf 
• NSI Training Overview 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/NSI_Training_Overview.pdf 
• National Strategy for Information Sharing: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html 
• National Information Exchange Model: www.niem.gov82 
                                                 
81 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders.” 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C., 2011, 53–54. 
82 Ibid., 77. 
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D. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING AND THE FUTURE 
The most misunderstood facet of information/intelligence sharing, as it related to 
the fire service, is the concept of suspicious activity reporting (SAR). This is a topic of 
future study due to the availability of possible technological solutions, legal issues, 
possible threat to the positive public perception enjoyed by the fire service, and 
implementation strategies. Regardless of ones feeling on the issue, in order to be a full 
partner in disseminating and receiving information/intelligence SAR usage in the fire 
service will need to be addressed. As the following quote from the ITACG shows, this is 
an issue that if not addressed will be a priority, “Because of the nature of their work, the 
more than 800,000 law enforcement and 1.2 million firefighters in the United States are 
perfectly poised to identify criminal activity that may be precursor indicators of acts of 
terrorism. In many instances, information that is based on suspicious behavior has led to 
the disruption of a terrorist attack, the arrest of individuals intending to do harm, or the 
corroboration of existing intelligence. It is of utmost importance that information on 
suspicious activities be shared with between federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector 
partners.”83 
As it currently stands, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 
Initiative (NSI) “is a comprehensive and coordinated effort to establish a “unified process 
for reporting, tracking, and accessing SARs” in a manner that rigorously protects the 
privacy and civil liberties of Americans. The NSI strategy is to develop, evaluate, and 
implement common processes and policies for gathering, documenting, processing, 
analyzing, and sharing information about terrorism-related suspicious activities … The 
long-term goal is that federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations, as 
well as the private sector, will participate in a standardized and integrated approach to 
SAR.”84 SAR is viewed important as an aid to law enforcement entities to carry out 
counterterrorism-related activities initiate investigations and provide information on all 
crimes. Using information gleaned in plain view of criminal activity or behavior, the 
                                                 
83 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders.” 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C., 2011, 76. 
84 Ibid., 74. 
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hope is that if this activity has a nexus to terrorism, law enforcement can become alerted 
to the planning of a terrorist attack prior to the attack being carried out. 
As with any new initiative, and especially one this potentially controversial, 
looking at this incident will need to address comprehensive training, policies and 
procedures to protect privacy and civil liberties, operational policies, and technical 
applications. More in-depth information and documents on this issue can be found at the 
following web sites that are valid as of January 2011. 
• Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections: A Key Component 
of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/NSI_Privacy_Briefing.pdf85 
• Additional resources and publications on the SAR initiative or the SAR 
process can be located at: www.nsi.ncirc.gov86 
• Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 
Support and Implementation Project: 
www.it.ojp.gov/documents/SARReportOctober2008.pdf87 
• Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard (FS) 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR): http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx88 
                                                 
85 Group, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination. “Intelligence Guide for First 
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